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In the past century, businesses have come to operate on a
national and often global level. In the past century, the United States
has seen an enormous nationalization and even globalization of
business. As a result, the actions of a single company increasingly
have the potential to affect people far beyond the boundaries of that
company's home state. When one or a few companies injure large
numbers of consumers across the country, aggregate litigation
(namely the class action lawsuit) becomes an especially attractive
remedy. Aggregating claims allows plaintiffs to save time and money
and may also enable them to present a more compelling case by
showing the extent of damages a defendant allegedly caused.
Though some of this litigation arises under federal law, many
of the underlying claims are governed by state law. Therefore, before
a court can aggregate the claims and allow plaintiffs to proceed as a
nationwide class, it must decide which state's law will apply to the
claims. This decision frequently creates a classic "choice-of-law
problem."1
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes class
actions as a form of aggregate litigation.2 For certification under Rule
23(b)(3), 3 plaintiffs must show that "questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members" and that the class action device will provide
a superior method of adjudication. 4 Rule 23(b)(3) lists a number of
factors that the court should consider in making the certification
decision, including "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action."5 A court will not likely certify a class
action that encompasses too many variations in either law or fact
because the class will not meet the predominance requirement or the
manageability standard.
1. Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 23(b)(3)
Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 835 (2000) ("[T]he courts have often been
confounded by the 'choice-of-law problem,' which refers to the fact that a federal court may be
obligated to apply the law of each individual class member's state of domicile to each of their
individual claims respectively, thereby frustrating Rule 23(b)(3)'s twin requirements.").
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. Though mandatory class actions may be certified under sections 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B),
and (b)(2), this Note will only address the opt-out class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
5. Id.
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In many class actions based on state law claims,6 plaintiffs
seeking certification have been able to prove that common questions of
fact exist, or at least that the class can be divided into manageable
subclasses, based on common factual backgrounds. 7 However, the
requirement that there be common questions of law raises a unique
set of problems8 which have, until recently, barred plaintiffs from
achieving certification of a nationwide class when the claims are based
in state law.9 State choice-of-law rules often create a situation in
which the court deciding the case has to apply the laws of different
states to the different class members. When a single court must apply
an unmanageable number of variations in state law to the class
members from different states, common questions of law do not
predominate. Therefore, the class cannot be certified.
This choice-of-law problem is no small issue. In fact, it can
have such a debilitating effect on an effort to bring nationwide class
actions that it has come to the forefront of recent class action reform
debate in Congress. With the passage of the Class Action Fairness
Act, 10 it will now be easier for defendants to remove class actions to
6. State law claims would include, for example, tort claims, products liability claims,
breach of warranty claims, breach of contract claims, etc. If the class action is based on federal
law claims, then federal law will control and the court does not need a choice-of-law analysis.
7. See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing the
predominance requirement and the possibility of subclassing when there are divergent interests
among class members).
8. Some authors have suggested that the use of the disjunctive "or" in Rule 23 suggests
that courts need not find common questions of law and common questions of fact, but rather they
must simply find either common questions of law or common questions of fact. See, e.g., Phair,
supra note 1, at 845 (contending that the word "or" is "disjunctive" and therefore requires that
either "questions of law or fact predominate"). Courts, however, do not take this same view, but
instead require that there be both common questions of law and fact.
9. See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A
nationwide class in what is fundamentally a breach-of-warranty action, coupled with a claim of
fraud, poses serious problems about choice of law, the manageability of the suit, and thus the
propriety of class certification."); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying a class because "the district court did not properly consider how variations in state
law affect predominance"); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3rd Cir. 1996)
("Initially, each individual plaintiffs claim raises radically different factual and legal issues from
those of other plaintiffs. These differences, when exponentially magnified by choice-of-law
considerations, eclipse any common issues in this case. In such circumstances, the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b) cannot be met."); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th
Cir. 1996) ("If more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face
an impossible task of instructing a jury on the relevant law, yet another reason why class
certification would not be the appropriate course of action."); Lichoff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 218
F.R.D. 564, 572 (N.D. Ohio 2003) ("[V]ariations in state law, when the laws of multiple states are
potentially applicable to a case, may severely decrease the practicality of trying the claims as a
class action."); Oxford v. Williams Cos., 137 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2001) ("In a multi-
state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues."); In re Ford Motor
Co., 194 F.R.D. 484, 489 (D.N.J. 2000).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2005).
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federal court.'1 As federal courts are perceived as less hospitable to
plaintiff classes, allowing removal is expected to increase the
defendant's chances of successfully having a class decertified once it is
in federal court. 12 An amendment to this act, proposed by Senator
Feinstein, would have limited a defendant's ability to have a class
removed to federal court and then decertified on choice-of-law
grounds. 13 The proposed amendment stated:
(1) the district court shall not deny class certification, in whole or in part, on the ground
that the law of more than 1 State will be applied; (2) the district court shall require each
party to submit their recommendations for subclassifications among the plaintiff class
based on substantially similar State law; and (3) the district court shall- (A) issue
subclassifications, as determined necessary, to permit the action to proceed; or (B) if the
district court determines such subclassifications are an impracticable method of
managing the action, the district court shall attempt to ensure that plaintiffs' State laws
are applied to the extent practical.14
The amendment, however, did not pass as part of the bill. 15 For better
or for worse, courts have thus been left without a viable solution to the
choice-of-law conflicts that arise in class actions.
The seemingly insurmountable choice-of-law barrier, however,
has not prevented plaintiffs from continuing to seek certification of
nationwide class actions. One of the most recent and perhaps most
successful attempts to certify a nationwide class action based on state-
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is a class action in which--
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant ....
Id. By changing the amount in controversy requirement and eliminating the complete diversity
requirement, this Act makes it easier for defendants to remove class actions to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction.
11. Id.
12. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present and Future: Solving Old Problems
and Dealing with "New Style" Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 237, 264 (2000) ("It is no
surprise, then, that plaintiffs' counsel seek out the most class action friendly jurisdictions
possible for their lawsuits. In most instances, these are state courts.").
Plaintiff lawyers are likely to forum shop for a state in which class certification is
relatively easy. They are also likely to want a large nationwide class, where the
recovery (and fees) will be extensive. Because some state courts have been more
liberal about certification than other courts, there will necessarily be some state class
action havens.
Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action-With a Comparative Eye,
7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 215 (1999).
13. 151 CONG. REC. S1215-02 (2005).
14. Id.
15. The amendment was rejected by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-eight. U.S. Senate, Vote
Summary on Feinstein Amdt. No. 4, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call-lists/roll_call




law claims was in Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.16 In this case, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the certification of an opt-out class
action by choosing the defendant's principal place of business as the
controlling law. 17 By doing this, the court avoided the application of
multiple state laws. i8  It found that common questions of law
predominated since there was only one state's law to apply, and
upheld the certified class. 19
While Ysbrand remains good law in Oklahoma,20 and certifying
the class using the law of the defendant's principal place of business
seems to solve the choice-of-law problem, this approach is not
necessarily correct or constitutionally sound. In determining which
substantive law to apply to a class, a court should only use the
defendant's principal place of business in cases where, had the action
been filed as an individual action, a choice-of-law analysis would lead
the court to apply the law of the defendant's principal place of
business. 21 Because a choice-of-law analysis will rarely, if ever, lead to
this conclusion, using the law of the defendant's principal place of
business is highly problematic, so courts faced with the certification
decision should not take this approach.
Part II of this Note will discuss the limitations on choice of law
that the Supreme Court articulated in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts22 and will explore the problems that arise when courts have to
make choice-of-law decisions for nationwide class actions. Part III
then considers the possibility of choosing the law of the defendant's
principal place of business as a method of getting around the choice-of-
law problem and uses Ysbrand as an example. Part IV examines
whether this new approach will work. This Section first explores the
due process concerns implicated when a court applies the law of the
defendant's principal place of business to actions that occurred outside
of the state and then turns to the "bootstrapping" problem articulated
in Shutts. Part V concludes that the approach of certifying a class
using the defendant's principal place of business as the controlling law
16. 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003).
17. Id. at 626.
18. Id. ("rhe needs of the interstate system and the basic policies of predictability and
uniformity of result require that the issue of product defect be determined in one forum with one
result rather than in 51 jurisdictions with the very real possibility of conflicting decisions.").
19. Id.
20. DaimlerChrysler tried to appeal this case to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was
denied. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ysbrand, 124 S.Ct. 2907 (2004).
21. See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 575-76
(1996) (arguing that a court's choice of law analysis should be the same for individuals and class
actions).
22. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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cannot be used to solve the choice-of-law problem. Due process
counsels against choosing the law of the defendant's principal place of
business for actions having their effects in multiple states, even in
individual suits. In addition, the fact that courts do not actually
choose this law when presented with an individual suit suggests that
under the Shutts anti-bootstrapping rationale, courts cannot change
their treatment of the claims merely because they are structured as a
class action.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Limitations Imposed on Choice of Law by Shutts
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court
articulated the necessary limits on a state court's decision when it
chooses the substantive law to apply to a nationwide class action.23 In
this case, oil and gas royalty owners filed a suit in Kansas seeking
interest payments on royalties that Phillips Petroleum had suspended
while it waited for the Federal Power Commission to approve its
increased gas prices. 24 Upholding the lower court's certification of the
class, the Supreme Court of Kansas found that choice-of-law concerns
did not require decertification. 25 Rather, it established that "the law
of the forum controlled all claims unless 'compelling reasons' existed to
apply a different law."26 The court recognized no compelling reasons
in the case before it and noted that because the plaintiffs had chosen
to have their claims resolved under Kansas law, no due process
problem existed; thus, the case could continue on a class-wide basis. 27
23. See id. at 823 (holding that a state court may apply "one of several choices of law" as
long as it conforms with certain constitutional limitations). Similarly, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., the Court further articulated that when a class action grounded in state law is
brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the federal court must apply the choice-of-
law rules of the state court where the federal court sits. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938) against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to
the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court
in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise
the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration
of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.
Id.
24. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799-800.
25. Id. at 803.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195 (1984)).
[Vol. 58:6:19251930
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found two
problems with the Kansas court's approach. First, the choice to apply
Kansas law to the claims of all class members was an arbitrary choice,
which violated the due process protection guaranteed to the defendant
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 Second, the more subtle problem
with the Kansas court's decision to apply forum law arose because of
what the Court called "bootstrapping."29 Essentially, the Supreme
Court explained that the existence of the class itself could not justify
choosing a certain state's law (in this case, the law of the forum).
30
1. Due Process and Arbitrariness
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State will
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."31 Starting with this basic constitutional guarantee, courts have
articulated a vague outline of the limits imposed by the Due Process
Clause on a court's choice of law. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
the Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy due process, a court
cannot, when choosing which state's law to apply, choose a law that
would be arbitrary or unfair.32 Therefore, if a court applies the law of
a state without performing a sound constitutional choice-of-law
analysis or simply defaults to the law of the forum, it may violate the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee.
In Shutts, the Supreme Court expanded upon Allstate and held
that the application of Kansas law to a class action where over 99% of
the leases in question had no apparent connection to Kansas was
unconstitutional as a matter of due process.33 The Court explained
that the "application of Kansas law to every claim in this case is
sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits."
34
The issue of which state's law could be constitutionally applied
remained for the lower court on remand, leaving open the possibility
that "in many situations a state court may be free to apply one of
several choices of law."35 Nevertheless, the Court firmly articulated
28. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
29. Id. at 821.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
33. 472 U.S. at 822.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 823.
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that "the constitutional limitations laid down in cases such as
Allstate ... must be respected even in a nationwide class action. '36
The standard for invoking a state's law is higher than the
standard for exercising personal jurisdiction over an absent
defendant. 37 For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party,
that party's conduct must have created at least minimum contacts
with the forum. 38 This requirement arises from due process notions of
fairness to the defendant. 39 In choosing which state's law to apply to
the controversy, due process restrictions require "that [a] [s]tate must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that [the] choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."40  Clearly, establishing
"significant" contacts requires something more than the "minimum
contacts" required for personal jurisdiction. 41 Though the Court in
Shutts did not definitively answer which choice of law meets the due
process requirement, it at least made clear that if each plaintiffs
"contact" lacks relation to the forum state, then applying the law of
the forum is not constitutional. 42
36. Id.
37. Phair, supra note 1, at 849; see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 88 (1978) ('To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state
should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law
is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.");
William D. Torchiana, Comment, Choice of Law and the Multistate Class: Forum Interests in
Matters Distant, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 922-23 (1986) ("[T]he consequences of reaching out to
assert jurisdiction may not be as severe as the consequences of reaching out to apply forum
law."). But see Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional Restraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 39, 56 (1998) (explaining that in practice, a '[c]ourt employs restrictive scrutiny in
personal jurisdiction cases, but minimal scrutiny in conflicts cases"' (quoting Louise Weinberg,
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 454 (1982))).
38. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
39. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807 ("The purpose of this test, of course, is to protect a defendant
from the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant's contacts with the forum
make it just to force him to defend there.").
40. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 821 (recognizing this distinction and noting that "[t]he issue of personal
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in a class action is entirely distinct from the question of the
constitutional limitations on choice of law").
42. Id. at 823.
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2. Bootstrapping
The Supreme Court's prohibition on "bootstrapping" prevents a
court from considering the existence of the class when engaging in a
choice-of-law analysis. 43 In Shutts, the Kansas Supreme Court relied
on the presence of a nationwide class to justify applying forum law.
44
It explained that when a state court has jurisdiction over a nationwide
class action, the law of the forum should apply unless there are
compelling reasons to apply the law of another jurisdiction.45 The
Supreme Court of the United States did not agree; it held that state
court jurisdiction over the class action could not provide "an added
weight in the scale when considering the permissible constitutional
limits on choice of substantive law."46 Referring to this as "something
of a 'bootstrap' argument," the Court explained that the state court
may not take a transaction with little or no relationship to the forum and apply the law
of the forum in order to satisfy the procedural requirement that there be a "common
question of law." The issue of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in a class action is
entirely distinct from the question of the constitutional limitations on choice of law; the
latter calculus is not altered by the fact that it may be more difficult or more
burdensome to comply with the constitutional limitations because of the large number of
transactions which the State proposes to adjudicate and which have little connection
with the forum.
4 7
In order to certify the class, the lower court had to find common
questions of law.48 Instead of finding common questions of law and
then certifying the class because of these common questions, the
Kansas Supreme Court used the fact that it had a class action before
it to find that because there were plaintiffs from every state, the
forum law was as good an option as any other.
49
The "bootstrapping" problem becomes most apparent when
considering what would have happened if the claims in Shutts had
been filed individually instead of as a class action. For most of these
individual claims, there would have been little reason to apply Kansas
law because most of the leases were held by people in states other
than Kansas. 50 Even if every one of the plaintiffs in the class had
individually filed his or her claim in Kansas, the court was still not
likely to have applied Kansas law. For example, Phillips Petroleum
43. See id. at 821.
44. Id. at 820-21.




49. Id. at 820-21.
50. Id. at 801, 815-16.
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was not located in Kansas, 51 and the terms of the lease were not
negotiated in Kansas. 52 Therefore, a Kansas court would be hard-
pressed to find justification for applying its own law to the
controversy. 53 Because the Kansas court used the existence of the
class action as a factor in its choice-of-law analysis, the Supreme
Court found that the Kansas court overstepped the constitutional
limitations on choice of law.
54
B. The Choice-of-Law Problem 
55
After Shutts, courts confronted with nationwide class actions
based on state law claims face a difficult problem. To satisfy Rule
23(b)(3), the certifying court has to find that the law that would apply
to the claims of each of the class members is the same, or at least
could be grouped into a manageable number of variations. 56 However,
in determining which state's law to apply, the court cannot choose a
law that is "arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair" under Allstate.
57
Furthermore, after Shutts, a court cannot use the presence of a class
to determine that the law of the forum applies, therefore supplying the
requisite "question of law or fact common to the class."5 8 If a court is
to comply with Shutts, it must approach the suit as it would approach
individual litigation, ignoring the fact that the litigation has been
51. Id. at 799.
52. See id. at 815 (stating that "some 97% of the plaintiffs in the case had no apparent
connection to the state of Kansas except for this lawsuit").
53. Had the claims been filed individually under a traditional choice-of-law analysis, the
Kansas court would probably have applied the laws of the state where the leases were executed
or the laws of the plaintiffs' domiciles to each of the individual claims. See id. at 806-07
(explaining that "the Due Process Clause did not permit a state to make a binding judgment
against a person with whom the state had no contacts" (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
54. Id. at 822.
55. Phair, supra note 1.
56. Id. at 835; see also COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 2.06 (American Law Inst.,
Preliminary Draft No. 3, forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Draft]; Kramer, supra note 21, at
586 (suggesting that claims can be grouped or subclassed so that the number of variations is
manageable); Phair, supra note 1, at 853 ("[A] viable method for overcoming manageability
concerns remains. Modern trial management techniques, such as grouping and subclassing,
make it possible for a district court to manage large, complex cases in a manner foreign to the
common law."). See generally Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G. Bough, Conflict of Laws and Multi-
State Class Actions: How Variations in State Law Affect the Predominance Requirement of Rule
23(b)(3), 68 UMKC L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1999) (explaining that subclasses may be used to address
variances in states' laws when "faced with a multistate class action that [] implicate[s] the laws
of numerous jurisdictions").
57. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
58. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a); see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 ("[T]he constitutional limitations laid
down in cases such as Allstate . . . must be respected even in a nationwide class action.").
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brought on behalf of a class, and choosing which states' laws to apply
based on the choice-of-law principles of the state in which the court
sits.
When a claim is brought in state court, that court will use its
own state's choice-of-law principles to determine which state's law
should govern the outcome of the case. Likewise, if a state-law claim
is brought in federal court, the court must look to the choice-of-law
principles of the state in which the court sits to determine which
state's law to apply. 59 The Class Action Fairness Act does not change
this analysis. Though class actions will be more easily removable to
federal court, once there, the federal court will still have to apply its
state's choice-of-law rules.60 In a single-plaintiff litigation setting, the
application of these rules rarely poses a problem. In a national class
action, however, choice-of-law considerations become much more
difficult because under many states' choice-of-law rules, the result will
require the court to apply the laws of all fifty states. 61
For example, if a suit is brought in a state that uses the law of
the "place of the injury" as the governing law and the class consists of
plaintiffs injured in all fifty states, the court conceivably would be
faced with the possibility of applying the laws of each of the fifty
states to the case.62 This approach would not be acceptable under the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirements for certification because it is impossible to
say that common questions of law predominate when multiple state
laws are at issue.63 Furthermore, a court will not be able to determine
that a class action is "superior" because it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to manage a suit with so many variations.
59. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 835 n.16.
60. See supra note 10.
61. This is the same analysis whether there is a class action filed in state court (in which
case the court will use its own choice-of-law principles to determine which state's law will
govern) or whether the action is in federal court on diversity grounds (in which case the federal
court will act as the state court in the district in which it sits and apply the same state court
choice-of-law principles that the state court would have applied). See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (finding that "[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by
the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts"). See
generally Patrick Wooley, Choice of Law and The Protection of Class Members in Class Suits
Certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 800-01
(2004) (arguing that Federal Rule 23 "should not be read to preempt the rule that federal courts
apply state choice-of-law rules, including, when applicable, a state-law presumption that the law
of the forum-state governs").
62. Admittedly, there would rarely, if ever, be a situation in which fifty different laws
actually apply. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 585 (explaining that "there is substantial
duplication among the various jurisdictions as to the applicable law").
63. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
that the suit at bar could not be certified as a class action because "a single nationwide class is
not manageable" where the "claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions").
2005] 1935
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In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. ("Bridgestone/Firestone I')
illustrates this choice-of-law problem. 64 In this case, the Seventh
Circuit decertified a class because the laws of fifty different states
would have to be applied and therefore common questions of law did
not predominate. 65 The case originated when a group of consumers,
who either owned or leased SUVs equipped with defective Bridgestone
tires, sued to recover damages for the diminished resale value of their
vehicles under theories of breach of warranty and consumer fraud.66
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision to certify the
class and use the law of the defendant's principal place of business as
the controlling law.67  Though the court acknowledged that the
holdings of certain earlier cases 68 indicated that the law of the
defendant's principal place of business may be the appropriate law, it
declined to rely on these other cases because the lower court had not
done so. 6 9 Instead, the Seventh Circuit found that Indiana was a lex
loci delicti70 state, so for each plaintiff, the court would have to apply
the law of the state where the financial loss was suffered.71 Since
there were plaintiffs from every state, a class action would require the
court to apply multiple state laws. Because "[n]o class action is proper
unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules," 72 the
Seventh Circuit held that the class was not manageable and could not
be certified.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1015, 1018.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1017, 1021.
68. The lower court had relied on the holding from Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson,
515 N.E. 2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987), for the proposition that "when the place of the injury 'bears
little connection to the legal action' a court may consider other factors, such as the place of the
conduct causing the injury and the residence of the parties." In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 288
F.2d at 1016.
69. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016.
Neither Indiana nor any other state has applied a uniform place-of-the-defendant's-
headquarters rule to products-liability cases. It is not hard to devise an argument that
such a uniform rule would be good on many dimensions, but that argument has not
carried the day with state judges, and it is state law rather than a quest for efficiency
in litigation (or in product design decisions) that controls.
Id.
70. "The law of the place where the offense was committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930
(8th ed. 2004).
71. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016 (The court determined that this would be
"the places where the vehicles and tires were purchased at excessive prices or resold at depressed
prices.").
72. Id. at 1015.
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The problems encountered in Bridgestone/Firestone 11 are
frequent obstacles for plaintiff classes.73 Requiring courts to use a
standard choice-of-law analysis and not allowing the fact that there is
a potential class action to bear on this determination makes it
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to bring a nationwide class action
based on state law claims.
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO CERTIFY USING THE LAW OF THE
DEFENDANT'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
Plaintiffs' attorneys have persisted in using new approaches to
overcome the seemingly insurmountable barrier of certifying a
nationwide class action based on state law claims. Because the place-
of-the-injury choice-of-law rule often results in applying the laws of all
fifty states, recent efforts have focused on using the law of the
defendant's principal place of business as the applicable law.74 As
there is usually only one or a couple of defendants in any given
litigation, applying the law of the defendant's place of business would
implicate only one or a few states' laws, making the rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement much easier to satisfy.
One way plaintiffs try to create a situation in which the court
will only apply the law of one state is by reframing their claims. A
typical situation in which plaintiffs attempt to certify a nationwide
class action under state law arises when claims are grounded in tort
or tort-like causes of action. In the typical case, there has been a
defective product, multi-state action, or injury that affects people
located around the country. Under normal choice-of-law rules, these
types of cases would require that the court apply the law of each of the
individual states. 75 As a solution to this barrier, however, creative
plaintiffs' attorneys have begun shifting the focus away from the
typical mass tort structure and have phrased their "injuries" in terms
73. See supra note 9.
74. See generally Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler -Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 627 (Okla. 2003)
(upholding certification of an opt-out class action by choosing the controlling law to be that of the
defendant's principal place of business).
75. "The traditional choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti, under which the law of the place
where the wrong is committed governs the substantive rights of the parties to a multi-state tort
action, remains in effect in a number of jurisdictions." 16 AM JUR. 2D. Conflict of Laws § 124
(2005). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971) (listing the
relevant factors a court should take into account when making a choice-of-law decision with
respect to an issue of tort and stating that the contacts include "(a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered").
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of breach of warranty or contract.76 This approach presses the court,
in applying its choice-of-law rules, to apply the law of a state other
than the state of the injury. The ultimate goal is to cast the claims in
such a way that the court will choose the law of a single state as the
applicable law for the claims of the class, avoiding the possibility of an
unmanageable number of states' laws. The recent case of Ysbrand v.
Daimler/ Chrysler Corp.77 illustrates this strategy.
In Ysbrand, a nationwide group of minivan owners filed a class
action against the defendant manufacturer for damages caused by an
alleged defective design in the front passenger side airbags.78 Though
this type of injury would typically give rise to a products liability or
tort cause of action, the plaintiffs in Ysbrand chose instead to frame
the issue as a breach of warranty claim under the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"). 79 Applying the law of the defendant's
principal place of business, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld
the certification of a nationwide class as to the breach of warranty
claim, finding no choice-of-law problem. 0
Relying on the "most significant relationship" test utilized by
the district court in Bridgestone/Firestone 1,81 the trial court in
76. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 125 S.Ct.1788, 1793 (2005) (examining plaintiff
farmers' claims of defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of
express warranty in addition to strict liability tort claims in a suit for damage caused to peanut
crops by defendant manufacturer's pesticide); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1017
("Plaintiffs describe the injury as financial rather than physical and seek to move the suit out of
the tort domain and into that of contract.., and consumer fraud.").
77. 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003).
78. When a claim is grounded in state tort law, under many states' choice-of-law rules the
appropriate law to apply will be the law of the state where the injury occurred. Thus, if the
plaintiffs had framed their claim in a way that resembled tort, likely they would have
encountered the "choice-of-law problem" and the class would not have been certified. However, by
strategically framing the issue as a breach of warranty, the plaintiff class was able to
successfully argue that the state with the most significant tie to the litigation (and therefore the
state whose law should be applied), was the place where the defendant's principal place of
business was located. Id. at 625-26.
79. The plaintiffs also included a claim for "fraud and deceit" in their complaint. Id. at 621.
However, this claim was not certified for class treatment because of choice-of-law concerns. Id. at
627. I will not further discuss the "fraud and deceit" claim in this paper, but it is worth
mentioning that under traditional choice-of-law analysis, a fraud claim results in the application
of the place where the contracts were made (i.e., place of injury), and so this presents the classic
choice-of-law problem situation where the law of fifty different states must be applied. Because
the breach of warranty claim is covered by the UCC it gives the court a little more room for
creative choice of law. A point of clarification may be necessary here. Though the UCC is a
uniform code that has been adopted virtually unchanged by the various states, when adopted the
UCC is still state (not federal) law. Therefore, it is subject to state court interpretations and
applications. Consequently, though it is a "uniform" standard, the applications of such standard
can still vary amongst states.
80. Id. at 626-27.
81. 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Ysbrand determined that under Oklahoma choice-of-law principles,
the law of the defendant's principal place of business should apply to
the breach of warranty claim.8 2 Since the law of only one state would
be applied, the court found that common questions of law did
predominate, and allowed certification of the class.8 3
Using the "most significant relationship" test articulated in the
Second Restatement of Conflicts,8 4 the trial court determined that the
law of the defendant's principal place of business should apply to the
UCC breach of warranty claim.8 5 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
agreed with this determination, explaining that because the interests
of the buyers' home states in this litigation were equal, Michigan's
interest in the case was the "most significant relationship."8 6  To
support this decision the court noted that "Michigan is where the
decisions concerning the design, manufacture, and distribution of the
minivans were made [and] Michigan is the only state where conduct
relevant to all class members occurred."8 7 As a final note supporting
the certification decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court briefly
referred to the standard articulated in Shutts.8s It noted that its
"conclusion is consistent with the constitutional imperative" that the
law chosen must not be arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.8 9
Though Ysbrand is one of the most recent cases in which
plaintiffs successfully obtained certification of a class of nationwide
plaintiffs by using the law of the defendant's principal place of
business, it is certainly not the first attempt to do so. In earlier cases,
courts certified classes by choosing the defendant's place of business
as the law to apply, thus getting around the choice-of-law problem.
For example, in In re ORFA Securities Litigation,90 the District Court
of New Jersey certified a class of shareholders that claimed that the
defendants had artificially inflated the price of ORFA common stock
according to the law of the defendant's place of business. The court
found that "although each Plaintiff may not have had direct contact
with New Jersey, the Defendants had their principal place of business
82. Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625.
83. Id.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 188(2) (1971) (listing the
factors and contacts the courts should take into account in applying the "most significant
relationship" test).
85. Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625.
86. Id. at 626.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)).
89. Id. (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818).
90. 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987).
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in New Jersey and the alleged misrepresentations which serve as the
gravamen of the Complaint originated in New Jersey."91
Most of the earlier cases certified using the law of the
defendant's principal place of business dealt with state law claims in
the context of securities litigation. In class actions involving state-law
claims regarding securities, the law of the defendant's principal place
of business may, in fact, be the logical choice of law. Though the
securities are sold nationwide, relevant conduct relating to these
securities occurs in one place. Furthermore, in the interest of
stabilizing the securities market, it may make practical sense to have
all issues surrounding a company's securities be governed by the same
substantive body of law.
Cases such as Ysbrand, on the other hand, move dangerously
close to the realm of tort or product liability and therefore stand at the
cutting edge of class action jurisprudence. In actions bearing a
resemblance to tort causes of action, (such as claims for breach of
warranty or products liability), the rationale for applying the law of
the defendant's principal place of business is less clear than it might
be in the context of securities litigation.92 In a nationwide business,
contracts are negotiated in every state, injuries occur in every state,
and potential plaintiffs live in every state. Therefore, every state has
an equal interest in regulating this behavior. If the decision in
Ysbrand stands, however, there could be an expansion in the number
of class actions certified using the law of only one state. The result
would cause a dramatic increase in certified class actions and the
virtual elimination of the choice-of-law problem.
IV. VIABILITY OF USING THE DEFENDANT'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS AS THE CONTROLLING LAW
The practical significance of applying the law of the defendant's
principal place of business to class actions is that more nationwide
91. Id. at 1463; see also Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 81-82 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(certifying a class action under Pennsylvania law when the defendant's "principal place of
business was in Pennsylvania, defendant has offices in Pennsylvania, a majority of the auditing
work was performed in Pennsylvania, and the financial statements were prepared in and
disseminated from Pennsylvania"); In re Activision, 621 F. Supp. 415, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(applying California law to a class action in which the plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Securities Act and California law when the defendant's "principal place of business is in
California, the issuance emanated from California, and the purchasers acceptances were directed
at California").
92. This is because usually with cases involving physical injury (sounding in tort), the law
of the plaintiffs' home state, the place where the injury occurred, applies. Thus, plaintiffs' home
state has the greatest interest in the litigation because it has the greatest interest in prohibiting
injury to its residents.
1940 [Vol. 58:6:1925
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
classes with claims grounded in state law will be certified. If courts
use the law of the defendant's principal place of business, then where
there are only one or several defendants, the law of only one or a few
states will apply to the class action. Thus, the choice-of-law barrier to
certification will cease to exist.
Using the law of the defendant's principal place of business
would not have to be the universal rule in order to drastically change
the state of class action law. Even if only a few states adopted the
approach that the court took in Ysbrand, many class actions would
have a chance at certification that would not otherwise have been
certified. Because jurisdiction in a nationwide class action is usually
proper in any state, if only a few states allow nationwide certification
using the defendant's principal place of business, plaintiffs can simply
file their cases in those states and avoid choice-of-law scrutiny.
Besides increasing the sheer number of class actions that will
be certified, allowing certification using the law of the defendant's
principal place of business will encourage forum shopping. Those
courts that allow certification using the law of the defendant's
principal place of business will become "magnet forums," and will be
in a position to dictate the outcome of class actions affecting the entire
nation.93 This would give these states a disproportionate amount of
power, a result which runs counter to notions of state equality and
sovereignty.9 4 The fates of hundreds of industries around the nations
would rest in the hands of a few state courts. Thus, "[1]ike the tail
wagging the dog, a state with an insubstantial interest in the dispute
can bind the nation."95  Though these are the inevitable results of
using the law of the defendant's principal place of business, the
93. As a practical matter, courts such as Oklahoma that do allow this kind of certification of
nationwide classes using the defendant's principal place of business will quickly become magnet
forums for plaintiffs attorneys seeking certification of these types of cases. This will have the
effect of encouraging forum shopping, which is problematic for many reasons. See David Crump
& Arthur R. Miller, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions after Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L. J. 1, 62 (1986) (noting that "constitutional limitations on
choice of law should be interpreted to limit unreasonable forum shopping").
94. Crump and Miller note that if the lower court holding in Shutts would have been
affirmed, it would have
created the danger that resort to "magnet" forums might defeat the chosen
substantive policy of other states. If all states adopted a similar approach, plaintiffs'
attorney would be able to identify a 'best' plaintiffs' forum in any class action. This
"magnet" jurisdiction would be the state most likely to hold against the defendant or
to award maximum damages. That forum might ignore laws of other states that would
produce a defendant's judgment or a lower recovery.
See id. at 57.
95. Id.
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primary question is whether the method itself is constitutionally
viable.
A. Due Process
In Allstate, the Supreme Court held that "for a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."96 Shutts applies
the Allstate rule to class actions.97  However, neither Shutts nor
Allstate clearly articulate the bounds of what constitutes an arbitrary
or unfair choice of law. Courts often discuss these terms generally in
the context of due process violations.98 Yet, like the evasive term "due
process," neither "arbitrariness" nor "unfairness" have concrete
definitions. 99  In attempting to answer whether the law of the
defendant's principal place of business would be a constitutionally
permissible choice of law in a nationwide class action, it is necessary
to first question whether such a choice in an individual suit would
violate the Due Process Clause's prohibition of arbitrariness and
unfairness.
An arbitrary or unfair choice of law presents due process
problems similar to those that arise when a court approves an
96. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13. In Allstate, the Court found that the
application of Minnesota law in a case where the decedent was employed by a Minnesota
company, where the defendant was present and doing business in Minnesota, and where the
plaintiff became a Minnesota resident prior to the institution of the litigation was neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Id. at 313-320.
97. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
98. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2005) ("[R]egulation
that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it
runs afoul of the Due Process Clause."); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 718 (2001) ("Liberty
under the Due Process Clause includes protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal
restraint or detention."); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 452-53 (2001) ("There is nothing to
indicate that abolition of the rule in petitioner's case represented an exercise of the sort of unfair
and arbitrary judicial action against which the Due Process Clause aims to protect.").
99. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 233, n.21 (6th Cir.
1972).
Probably the most that can be said in a general way is that due process embodies a
test of fundamental fairness in all steps of the proceedings; and that our sense of
fairness is outraged by certain assertions of jurisdiction on the part of States
unconnected with the parties or with the controversy; and that this sense of
unfairness stems partly from the inconvenience and expense involved, partly from the
idea of unfair surprise, partly from the anticipation of an improper choice of law, and
partly from general notions of the limits of a state's rightful sovereignty.
Id. (citing David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 535 (1963)).
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excessive punitive damages award. 100 In BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore,101 the Supreme Court struck down a punitive damages award,
finding it to be grossly excessive and therefore in violation of the
guarantees of the Due Process Clause. 10 2 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens explained the protections guaranteed to the defendant
by the Due Process Clause. He noted that "[e]lementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him
to punishment, but also the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose."103 The idea is that due process requires that the defendant
receive fair warning of the punishment that he will suffer as a result
of his actions. The parallel between excessive punitive damages and
an unconstitutional choice of law is derived from these core notions of
due process.
10 4
For a court to apply the law of the forum to a case before it, at a
minimum, "contacts between the forum and the parties must be of
such a nature that the parties might have expected their activities to
be judged under forum law."10 5 This expectation was not satisfied in
Shutts, which was precisely why the court found the choice of law to
be unconstitutional. The defendant in Shutts was not located in
Kansas nor did it have lease agreements with many people in Kansas.
Further, its employees probably had never traveled to Kansas, even to
execute the leases.10 6 Thus, as the court explains, the application of
Kansas law to the controversy seems arbitrary in the clearest sense.10
7
It would be difficult to argue that the application of the law of
the defendant's principal place of business is as arbitrary as the choice
of forum law in Shutts. There would certainly be personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in its state of incorporation. Furthermore, the
100. See Fruehwald, supra note 37, at 71 ("States' unreasonable choice of law falls into the
same category as excessive punitive damages. As was true of the excessive punitive damages...
when a state chooses its law despite another state's significantly closer connection to the
controversy, it has imposed its law on its neighbors.").
101. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
102. Id. at 574-75.
103. Id. at 574.
104. See Fruehwald, supra note 37, at 71.
105. Torchiana, supra note 37, at 917.
There is no element of unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations as a
result of Minnesota's choice of its law. Because Allstate was doing business in
Minnesota and was undoubtedly aware that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota employee, it
had to have anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident in which Mr.
Hague was involved.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981).
106. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-16 (1985).
107. Id. at 822.
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defendant cannot likely argue that it will be prejudiced if the law of its
own state is applied. Thus, it is entirely feasible that a court could
choose to apply the law of the defendant's principal place of business
to any given suit and that such choice would not be characterized as
"arbitrary."108
Due process protections, however, also ensure fundamental
fairness to the defendant. Therefore, even a non-arbitrary choice of
law may violate due process if such a choice is fundamentally unfair.
For instance, even where the choice of forum law is not arbitrary, "the
forum State's interest in the efficient operation of its judicial system is
clearly not sufficient ... to justify the application of a rule of law that
is fundamentally unfair to one of the litigants."'10 9
If a defendant acts wholly within the boundaries of a certain
state, it can expect to be bound by the laws of the state in which it is
acting. However, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant
should therefore expect to be bound by the laws of its own state for
actions taken in a different state as, "[t]he application of an otherwise
acceptable rule of law may result in unfairness to the litigants if, in
engaging in the activity which is the subject of the litigation, they
could not reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be
judged by this rule of law." 110  For example, if a person traveled to
Nevada to take advantage of Nevada's gambling laws and then
returned to his home state after a weekend of gambling, it seems
fundamentally unfair to hold this person liable under his home state's
stricter laws against gambling for his actions in Nevada.'
The fact that the defendant sells its products in every state
does not change the fact that it expects to be bound by the individual
state laws for its actions in the individual states. The principal
articulated in Gore, that "to punish a person because he has done
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the
most basic sort,"" 2 holds true even in situations where a defendant is
108. See, e.g., In re ORFA, 654 F. Supp 1449, 1464 (D.N.J. 1987) (justifying the application of
the law of the defendant's principal place of business because "[d]efendants chose to use New
Jersey as their principal place of business and cannot claim surprise at being held to the state's
legal standards").
109. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring).
111. This illustration becomes even clearer when explained in terms of international laws.
For example, in some countries, the use of marijuana is legal. Therefore, if a U.S. citizen travels
to these countries and uses marijuana while there, it would be fundamentally unfair for the
United States to prosecute persons who smoke marijuana legally while abroad.
112. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559. 573 n.19 (1996) (citing Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 422 (stating that when considering the culpability of a defendant in a certain state, a jury
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manufacturing a product and then selling it across the country. So,
when there is a conflict between state laws, a defendant should expect
to be bound by the laws of State A for its actions in State A and to be
bound by State B for its actions in State B.
To illustrate this concept, we start with a conflict relevant in
Ysbrand: the issue of whether a plaintiff can recover damages absent
physical injury. Most states do not allow such recovery. 113 Therefore,
when a defendant sells vehicles in those states that do not allow
recovery in this situation, it has no reason to expect that it will be held
liable (be "punished") for selling its faulty products in those states, so
long as the products do not cause physical injury. For states that do
allow recovery absent physical injury, however, the defendant is on
notice that if it breaches its warranty, it may be held liable in those
states that permit recovery for economic loss. The fact that the
defendant happens to have manufactured the vehicles in a state that
allows recovery for pure economic loss does not change the fact that
when the defendant sold its products in a state that does not allow
recovery for pure economic loss, it expected to be bound by the laws of
that state.
Admittedly, adjudicating a single defendant's actions under the
laws of the fifty states will produce inconsistent results. A defendant
will be able to escape liability for certain actions in states that happen
to have more lax laws. However, this is the necessary and in some
ways, desirable result of having a federal system where fifty states
can enact their own sets of laws. 114 For example, if Kentucky does not
want to protect its citizens from the purely economic harm that results
when a warranty is breached, courts should honor this decision and
not allow Kentucky plaintiffs to take advantage of a different state's
more favorable laws when the events giving rise to the cause of action
occurred wholly within Kentucky.11 5  Thus, as a matter of
"may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in
the jurisdiction where it occurred").
113. See Brief for Oklahoma State Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003) (No.
03-1342) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (discussing states that do not allow recovery for breach of
warranty).
114. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) ("Whatever lack of
uniformity [requiring federal courts to follow state courts' choice-of-law rules] may produce
between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a
state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging
from those of its neighbors.").
115. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
[Ilt would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the
jurisdiction of that state.., without throwing down the constitutional barriers by
which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon
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fundamental fairness to the defendant, courts should not apply the
law of the defendant's principal place of business in an individual suit,
and should certainly not do so on an aggregate basis.
B. The Bootstrapping Debate
Even if a court believes that the application of the law of the
defendant's principal place of business should be constitutionally
permissible, if the court would not apply the law of the defendant's
principal place of business in an individual suit (either because such a
choice would be unconstitutional or alternatively, because that state's
choice-of-law principles would not point to the law of the defendant's
principal place of business), the court cannot use the existence of the
class action to justify such an application. The Court in Shutts held
that the existence of the class itself cannot be a factor in the choice-of-
law determination. 116  This has come to be known as
"bootstrapping."117 This Section questions the viability of the "anti-
bootstrapping" position taken in Shutts as an issue distinct from the
due process issue discussed above. The question of whether a court
should, as a matter of due process, apply the law of the defendant's
principal place of business considers each individual cause of action.
The bootstrapping question asks whether, even if there were no due
process barrier to applying the law of the defendant's principal place
of business in each individual suit, a court could apply this law to a
class of nationwide plaintiffs. An analysis of the bootstrapping
question must consider whether the position in Shutts should be
followed, or whether courts should be allowed more freedom in
certifying classes using a bootstrap rationale.
1. Using the Law of the Defendant's Principal Place of Business Will
Often Require Bootstrapping
A court cannot easily certify a class action using the law of the
defendant's principal place of business as the controlling law without
bootstrapping.118 The recent Ysbrand decision serves as a useful
illustration. 1 9
the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends. This is so
obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in
question and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound.
Id.
116. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003).
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Under most states' choice-of-law principles, an action to recover
for breach of warranty will be decided under the law of the state
where the plaintiff was located and the warranty was negotiated.
120
This result should have been no different in Oklahoma, where
Ysbrand was litigated. Oklahoma follows the "most significant
relationship" test outlined in the Second Restatement of Conflicts. 121
Under the Restatement, relevant factors to be considered in choice-of-
law decisions for claims arising out of contract are: (a) the place of
contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties.1 22 Furthermore, section 191 provides
that when the issue involves the sale of interests in chattel, the
controlling law should be "the local law of the state where under the
terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the chattel unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship."123
Five of the six Restatement factors clearly point to the law of
the state where the sale was made as the appropriate law to govern
the breach of warranty claim. The only one of these Restatement
factors that might point to the defendant's principal place of business
is (e), "the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties."1 24 However, even this factor is "offset
by the fact that the plaintiffs are domiciled all over the country."125
Thus, based simply on the factors in the Restatement, the appropriate
law to apply to a breach of warranty claim adjudicated on an
individual basis would be that of each plaintiffs state of residence.
Therefore, it is readily apparent that the appropriate laws to apply to
the Ysbrand action would have been those of the individual states
where the warranties were negotiated and where the minivans were
sold.
The court in Ysbrand complicated its choice-of-law analysis by
focusing on the fact that the proposed action was a class action. It
stated:
120. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) ("If
recovery for breach of warranty or consumer fraud is possible, the injury is decidedly where the
consumer is located, rather than where the seller maintains its headquarters."); Spence v. Glock,
227 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the location of the plaintiffs injury "plays an
important role" in choice-of-law determinations).
121. Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625-26.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
123. Id. § 191.
124. Id. § 188(2).
125. Glock, 227 F.3d at 312.
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All 50 states and the District of Columbia bear some relationship to the parties and
transactions in this dispute by virtue of the nationwide sales of the minivans. The
question becomes whether the relationship of each state where the vehicles were
purchased is more significant to the parties and this litigation than that of Michigan,
the principal place of business of DiamlerChrysler. 1
26
The court considered the class action, examined all the claims
in the aggregate, and determined that out of the fifty states, Michigan
had the most significant interest. 127 It noted that "Michigan is the
only state where conduct relevant to all class members occurred."'
128 It
is precisely this statement that contradicts the mandate of Shutts.
This decision to apply the law of the defendant's principal place
of business is an example of bootstrapping because the court has taken
the existence of the class itself into consideration in making its choice-
of-law determination. 129 If all of the plaintiffs in this class brought
their claims individually in their respective states, those state courts,
using their own choice-of-law principles, would have weighed the
interests of the various states in choosing what law to apply and, most
likely, would have determined that the law of the plaintiffs' home
states should control. 130 Even if all of the plaintiffs in the class had
filed their claims in the same forum, even if this forum had been in
the state where the defendant had its principal place of business, this
one forum still would not be justified in applying one law to these
cases. 131 Under the anti-bootstrapping rationale offered in Shutts, this
forum would still have to perform a choice-of-law analysis for each
individual claim.' 32 Though it would be able to hear and decide the
individual cases, this forum would most likely have to do so using the
law of the states where the plaintiffs reside, where the injury
occurred, or where the sales were made. l 33 In a situation like Ysbrand
where the court chose to apply the law of the defendant's principal
place of business, 134 it is only because the claims were brought as a
class action that the court can justify this choice. The Supreme Court
in Shutts stated that courts may not bootstrap in order to certify a
class. 13 5 The court in Ysbrand clearly bootstrapped.
136
126. Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625.
127. Id. at 626.
128. Id.
129. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124 for a discussion of the Second Restatement's
approach to breach of contract claims. Most of the factors weigh in favor of plaintiffs' home
states.
131. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 625 (Okla. 2003).
135. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821.
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The tension between Ysbrand and Shutts illustrates the
opposing sides of the bootstrapping debate and highlights the
significance of the Shutts anti-bootstrapping position. On one hand is
the argument that bootstrapping is an entirely legitimate and, in fact,
desirable way to handle class actions. On the other is the view that
Shutts should be followed as several reasons, including stare decisis,
counsel in favor of following the anti-bootstrapping position.
2. The Argument in Favor of Applying the Law of a Single State
In the introduction to his Article, Larry Kramer explained that
there is "consensus, at least, that ordinary choice-of-law practices
should yield in suits consolidating large numbers of claims and that
courts should apply a single law in such cases."1 37 To some degree, he
is correct. There is a sector of academic writing that argues that in
the interest of judicial economy, efforts should be made to erase the
"choice-of-law problem." 138 One suggestion for accomplishing this is to
ignore the "anti-bootstrapping" rule of Shutts, and instead to change
the choice-of-law default rules in the class setting. 139 This was the
position taken by the American Law Institution ("ALI") in the first
draft of its Complex Litigation Project, published in 1993.140 In the
introductory note to the chapter on choice-of-law rules, the ALI
justified altering the choice-of-law rules in the complext litigation
context based on the "special needs of complex litigation."1 41 The
underlying premise of the ALI's proposed choice-of-law rules was that
136. Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625.
137. Kramer, supra note 21, at 547.
138. See infra note 139.
139. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 398 (American Law Inst., First Proposed Draft, 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Draft] ("[T]he objective underlying the rules is to allow a single state's tort law
to apply to all similar claims asserted against each defendant, to the extent it is feasible to do so.
In this way, the application of § 6.01 fosters the consolidated treatment of the mass tort claims
under this proposal."); James A.R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex
Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1013 (1994) (stating that "a
consensus has emerged in favor of applying the same body of rules to govern all issues in a single
case"); Kramer, supra note 21, at 548. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the
Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105 (1989) (calling for choice-of-law rules that simplify
litigation in mass disaster tort cases).
140. 1993 Draft, supra note 139, at 375-443.
141. Id. at 379-80.
[A]lthough the adoption of a federal choice of law code for complex cases will mean
that there will be a disparity in treatment between parties in this class of cases from
those engaged in smaller, but analogous, litigation not subject to transfer and
consolidation under this scheme, the need to achieve justice.., of their dispute
justifies this difference.
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"it would be highly desirable if a single state's law could be applied to
a particular issue that is common to all the claims and parties
involved in the litigation."'' 42 Doing so would help "maximize the
efficient handling of the litigation, as well as encourage consistent
results."'143 In its draft, the ALI suggested a new federal choice-of-law
rule to be applied in the context of state-created actions that are
consolidated under its proposed complex litigation statute.
144
In its latest revision of the Complex Litigation Manual,
scheduled for publication in 2005, the ALI takes a different
approach. 145 Instead of advocating different choice-of-law default
rules in class actions, the ALI states that there will be "no change in
what one might call the court's choice of choice-of-law principles."'
146
However, the ALI seems to leave open the possibility that the state
courts' choice-of-law principles could be altered, noting "the objective
is for aggregate treatment to operate seamlessly with substantive
law.., by leaving the choice of whether to innovate in the area of
choice-of-law principles to the institutions with the authority to set
those principles themselves."'
147
Many scholars, including Kramer, urge the enactment of a
uniform choice-of-law standard, which theoretically could be crafted in
such a way as to eliminate the choice-of-law problem. 148 However, as
Kramer aptly points out, Congress has not yet created such a uniform
standard, and until it does, courts are left to grapple with the existing
patchwork of individual state choice-of-law rules.149 This absence of
142. Id. at 389.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 395-443. See generally Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law,
70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992) (arguing against individual state control of choice-of-law principles,
and instead, for a federal choice-of-law rule).
145. 2005 Draft, supra note 56.
146. Id. at 127.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice
of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1079 (1987) ("This Note therefore proposes that Congress
enact a choice of law statute enabling and directing federal courts presiding over mass tort
litigation to make choice of law decisions that will promote both equity and efficiency."). But see
Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally-Mandated Choice of
Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1994)
("[T]he concept of federally-mandated choice-of-law rules for mass torts should be rejected
because ... it is inconsistent with the principles of state sovereignty that lie at the heart of our
federal system.").
149. Kramer, supra note 21, at 549-50.
[T]he solution is to work for the adoption of such law, something advocated by almost
every commentator who has discussed complex litigation. To date, such efforts have
been unavailing, and Congress has declined to legislate-whether from lack of
political will, the urge to toady to palm-greasing lobbyists, or wisdom in recognizing
the benefits of leaving states a role.
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
uniformity becomes especially relevant in light of the recent vote not
to include a choice-of-law section in the Class Action Fairness Act.150
The absence of a uniform standard, however, does not stop
academics from questioning the validity of an approach that applies
fifty different state laws to what essentially is one set of actions.
Many scholars advance the proposition that in applying the different
state laws to the different class members, courts actually treat
plaintiffs unfairly. 151 The problem is that "identical facts may have to
be tried under fifty or more different laws. Such fragmentation can
cause striking disparities in the recovery for the death or injury of
victims of the same accident, and the plaintiffs' fates may depend less
on the justice of their causes than on their selection of an initial
forum."152 Therefore, scholars argue that "[c]hoice-of-law approaches
that subject the victims' claims to different substantive laws are not
merely unfair: by necessitating separate trials they further complicate
complex litigation. 153
These arguments in favor of applying the laws of a single state
are compelling and require consideration. On some level, we must
question whether it is fair, for example, that a plaintiff who purchased
a product in state A can recover damages for her injury, but one who
bought the exact same product in state B cannot. Most of the
proposed solutions to this inequity require some kind of congressional
action. These solutions call for a uniform standard, which, as the
recent attempts at certification suggest, could be the law of the
defendant's principal place of business. But Congress has not yet
enacted such a uniform standard, 154 and, in the absence of a
congressional mandate, we are left to consider the limits of judicial
action in the area of conflicts of law.
Id.
150. Vote, supra note 15.
151. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 566 ("[W]e are told that it is unfair to apply different laws
to different parties in a complex case. To treat parties in the same consolidated mass action
differently violates 'the principle that persons similarly situated ought to receive similar
treatment."'); Juenger, supra note 139, at 109.
152. Juenger, supra note 139, at 109.
153. Id. at 109-10.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
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3. Constitutional Justifications for the Anti-Bootstrapping Position
a. The Choice-of-Law Decision is Substantive, Not Procedural
The argument for choosing a single law to apply to a class
action often assumes that the choice of law is merely a procedural
issue, which, in the interest of furthering class litigation, weighs in
favor of one law.15 5 However, choice of law is not merely about
procedure. 15 6  Rather, at its very core, choice of law is about
substantive rights: "Choice of law is, literally, the assignation of rights
to the parties-the decision defining what the plaintiff and defendant
are entitled to on the particular facts. It is in this strong and
fundamental sense, in terms of both its purpose and effect, that choice
of law is substantive."'
' 57
The misperception of choice of law as a procedural point
instead of a substantive one is perhaps hidden in cases where the laws
of the different states do not conflict. In that situation, a choice of
applying the law of one state over the law of another would not change
the outcome-the result would be the same under either state's law.
Whether the claims were brought individually or on a class-wide basis,
the choice of one state's law over another would not make any kind of
real, substantive difference. In this scenario, choice of law does seem
to be merely a procedural technicality that should not matter in the
context of class actions.
The substantive nature of choice of law becomes readily
apparent when there is a conflict in law. If there are differences in the
applicable laws, this "may mean the difference between winning and
losing, between unlimited damages and a cap, between recovering
punitive damages and being limited to compensation."'158 For example,
if State A allows courts to award punitive damages for a certain type
of claim, but State B does not, the decision whether to decide the case
under the law of State A or State B will dramatically affect the
amount that the plaintiff can recover. This effect is heightened when
a court bootstraps. Doing so allows it to create a cause of action or
155. See, e.g., 1993 Draft, supra note 139, at 375 ("[Ijt becomes important to look for an
alternative that could improve the current processing of complex litigation in the courts-in
other words, a procedural solution. This Chapter proposes the enactment of a coherent and
uniform federal choice of law code for these cases as an essential ingredient of that procedural
approach."). But see 2005 Draft, supra note 56 (citing Kramer for the proposition that choice of
law is substantive, not procedural).
156. Kramer, supra note 21, at 569.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 589.
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recovery amount not only for an individual, but also for every single
member of the proposed class. Both Ysbrand and Shutts illustrate
this effect, and in each of these cases, the choice of law dramatically
affected the substantive rights of the parties. In Shutts, the decision
to apply Kansas law over Texas or Oklahoma law would have
significantly increased the amount each plaintiff could recover. 159
Similarly, in Ysbrand, the decision to apply Michigan law, as opposed
to the law of the plaintiffs' home states, may have created an
otherwise lacking cause of action for the plaintiffs as there is a chance
that plaintiffs would recover for pure economic loss under Michigan
law, while they would not be able to do so under the laws of their
respective home states.
b. A Court is Not the Appropriate Body to Alter Substantive Rights
Judicial economy, efficiency, and "fairness" to the plaintiffs
provide compelling justifications for choosing one law to govern an
entire group of similar claims. However, choosing which one law to
apply is not necessarily a simple task. More importantly, the
"solution" of having claims from plaintiffs in all the fifty states
governed by the law of only one state is not necessarily a desirable
outcome. 160 The ability to alter and enlarge the rights of potential
parties should lie with the inherent lawmaking authority of the
legislative branch, not with the judicial system.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the
procedural requirements for class actions. 161 In the Rules Enabling
Act, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts."' 62  It is through this express
delegation that the Court finds the authority for all of the rules it
creates and enforces. Yet, Congress specifically limited this
rulemaking power by including in the Rules Enabling Act the
159. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (noting that because of the
different interest rates Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma used in calculating this type of damages,
"[t]he conflicts on the applicable interest rates alone.., certainly amounted to millions of dollars
in liability").
160. Kramer, supra note 21, at 57.
[W]e are told we must change the parties' rights to facilitate the consolidated
adjudication. And that makes no sense. If the reason for consolidating is to make
adjudication of the parties' rights more efficient and effective, then the fact of
consolidation itself cannot justify changing those rights. To let it do to is truly to let
the tail wag the dog.
Id.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
162. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2005).
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restriction that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."163  By restricting the Court's power to only
procedural issues, the Rules Enabling Act specifically aims "to exclude
rulemaking by the Supreme Court, and to require that any prospective
federal lawmaking be done by Congress, where the choice among legal
prescriptions would have a predictable and identifiable effect on
[existing legal] rights."164 Thus, in the Rules Enabling Act, Congress
specifically reserves the power to alter existing rights for itself,
forbidding the Court from undertaking such a task.
This general mandate is helpful as an explanatory tool but
loses some relevance in the context of nationwide class actions filed in
state courts. Though state courts' class action rules often mirror the
language of Federal Rule 23, states are allowed to interpret and apply
their own versions of Rule 23.165 Nonetheless, the idea that courts
cannot use procedural rules to enlarge the substantive rights of
parties carries over into many of the state courts. Most states have
their own equivalents of the Rules Enabling Act, which similarly limit
the power of the courts to making procedural rules but not changing
substantive rights. 166 Some states even explicitly mandate that in
making procedural rules, courts "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
the substantive rights of any litigant."16 7 Thus, if class actions are
filed in states that do have such a rule, courts will be limited (as are
federal courts) in their ability to use procedure to change substantive
rights.
163. Id. § 2072(b)
164. Richard Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 190 (2003) (citing Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1114 (1982)).
165. See J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) ("While
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 [governing class actions in Texas courts] is modeled on Rule 23
of the Federal Rules, and federal decisions are viewed as persuasive authority regarding the
construction of the Texas class action rule, a Texas court might well exercise this discretion in a
different manner.").
166. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-2-7 (2005) ("The Supreme Court shall have authority:... (4)
To make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing
practice and procedure in all courts; provided, that such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify the substantive right of any party."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 561(b) (2005) ("The rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right of any party, and they shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the statutes and Constitution of
this State."); MO. REV. STAT. § 477.010 (2005) ("The supreme court shall have the power to direct
the form of writs and process; and to promulgate general rules for all courts of the state. No such
forms or rules shall abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant nor be
contrary to or inconsistent with the laws in force for the time being."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 102 (2005)
("No rule so amended, rescinded or adopted shall abridge or enlarge the substantive rights of any
party.").
167. N. M. STAT. § 38-1-1 (2005).
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A judicial alteration of substantive rights would also be
problematic under the separation of powers doctrine.168 Therefore,
even those states that do not explicitly restrict a court's ability to
expand substantive rights should observe such a policy to maintain
the functional roles of the court and legislature. Legislatures exist to
make decisions about which rights should and should not be
recognized.16 9 Thus, when a court attempts to alter substantive rights
through procedural rules, it steps into the boundaries of powers
specifically reserved to the legislature.1 70 As Professor Charles Alan
Wright noted, "[Cihanges with more predictable consequences for
identifiable interest groups 'should come from those who are elected to
make laws, with full awareness of what they are doing."'1 71  The
legislature is a political body specifically designed to determine what
liberties should be restricted in the interest of the broader
community. 172 Democratically accountable legislatures are the proper
168. See Burbank, supra note 164, at 1025-26 (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act was
created not to address federalism concerns, but rather, to address the appropriate allocation of
power between Congress and the courts).
169. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 565
(1991).
The grant of authority to regulate procedure and the denial of authority to alter
substantive rights expresses proper concern for federalism and separation of powers.
Congress desired the courts to regulate 'practice and procedure,' an area where we
have expertise and some degree of inherent authority. But Congress wanted the
definition of substantive rights left to itself in cases where federal law applies, or to
the States where state substantive law governs.
Id.
A legislative body is in a far better position than a court to form a correct judgment
concerning the number of persons affected by a change in the law, the means by which
information concerning the law is disseminated in the community, and the likelihood
that innocent persons may be harmed by the failure to receive adequate notice.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982); see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)
("Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts,
to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."); see also C. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509 (1982); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 246-312 (2004).
170. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 70-72 (1998).
As to some matters that fall in the area where procedure and substance overlap,
separation of powers concerns and the constitutional structure prohibit a court from
regulating them, even on a case-by-case basis, in the absence of some legislative or
constitutional directive ... [For exampleJ some substantive matters involve policy
choices of such significance that, even though federal courts may determine their
scope as a matter of common law in appropriate cases, separation of powers
considerations mandate that they be subject to prospective regulation only by a
democratically elected legislature, rather than by court-promulgated rule.
Id.
171. Nagareda, supra note 164, at 190 (citing Charles Allen Wright, Procedural Reform: Its
Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 570 (1967)).
172. See Kelleher, supra note 170.
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governmental unit to judge what will be best for society as a whole.
Courts are not structured to handle these types of "judgment call"
situations and so they cannot, in any sense, be thought of as the
appropriate body to enlarge or diminish people's rights or to choose
between competing rights. 173 Rather, their role in the government is
to judge the legality or illegality of actions from a neutral
standpoint. 174
This limitation on courts seems simple enough: a court may
enact and apply procedural rules, but such procedural rules cannot
alter substantive rights. 175 Though this division between what a court
can and cannot do procedurally seems clear in theory, in practice it
becomes much more muddled.1 76  As Wright stated, "[E]very
procedural rule has consequences of a substantive nature, for every
such rule may affect the outcome in some cases, and some of them are
deliberately intended to alter the outcome in many cases."' 77  If
procedural rules, including Rule 23, are not to be used to enlarge
substantive rights, then a court cannot use the class action device
itself to justify changing substantive law by applying choice-of-law
rules to class actions that are different from those than it would apply
to individual suits.
The modern class action lies on the dividing line between
acceptable procedural actions and unacceptable alteration of
substantive rights. Though the class action itself is merely a
procedural device for aggregating potential claims, there are many
instances in which courts step dangerously close to, or perhaps even
into, the prohibited realm of substantive rights. Thus, if a court uses
the presence of a class action to make a choice-of-law decision that
enlarges the rights of individual plaintiffs, essentially creating
substantive rights that would not exist were the claims brought on an
individual basis, the court is using procedural rules improperly to
alter the substantive rights of parties. These "unexplained
inconsistencies in the application of choice-of-law principles to a class
action may signal a constitutional violation."178 Different treatment of
aggregated claims is highly problematic if the result is to enlarge the
body of rights held by the individual claimants.1 79
173. See supra note 169.
174. Id.
175. See Nagareda, supra note 164, at 190-91.
176. Id.
177. Wright, supra note 171, at 570.
178. Crump & Miller, supra note 94, at 62.
179. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 572-74.
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If a plaintiff in state A joins a class action filed in state B and
thereby gains a cause of action the plaintiff would not have had under
normal choice-of-law principles, then the presence of the class action
has enlarged this plaintiffs substantive rights. Thus, even if it is not
apparent that a procedural rule alters existing rights, if the effect is to
change the rights of the parties involved, then there is a conflict with
the mandate of the Rules Enabling Act, the state equivalents of this
Act, and the central premise of the doctrine of separation of powers.
To illustrate the problem that arises when courts
impermissibly bootstrap and use the choice-of-law decision to alter
parties' rights, we return to Ysbrand. In Ysbrand, the court
overstepped constitutional bounds and used procedure to potentially
enlarge almost all of the plaintiffs' preexisting substantive rights.
Most of the plaintiffs resided in states that did not allow recovery for
breach of warranty when there was no physical injury.180 Therefore,
many would not have had a cause of action had they brought their
claims individually, either in their own respective states or in another
state, because choice-of-law considerations would likely have forced
their cases to be decided under the laws of the states where the sale
was made. Even if all the plaintiffs had individually filed their cases
in Michigan, where recovery for pure economic loss might be available,
the Michigan court would not have applied Michigan law to their
claims. Rather, it would have applied the laws of the individual states
to each individual claim. Although it is uncertain whether Michigan
allows recovery for breach of warranty when there is no actual
180. See Amicus Brief, supra note 113, at 6.
Many, if not most, jurisdictions that have considered the viability of such "no injury"
economic-loss-only warranty claims have refused to recognize them, holding that
purchasers of an allegedly defective product do not have a cognizable claim if the
defect has not manifested itself in the product they own. See, e.g., Yost v. General
Motors Corp., 651 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D.N.J. 1986) ("Damage is a necessary element of
both counts-breach of warranty and common law fraud."); Jarman v. United
Industries Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (plaintiff did not have a
claim for breach of warranty because, "unless there is actually a failure in product
performance, there is no basis at all for claiming that the plaintiff has been damaged
in any way"); Feinstein v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 602
(D.C.N.Y. 1982) (under New York's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, "[tlires
which lived full, productive lives were, by demonstration and definition, 'fit for the
ordinary purposes' for which they were used; hence they were 'merchantable'. . ., and
no cause of action for breach of an implied warranty can arise"); Carlson v. General
Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 298 (4th Cir. 1989) (no claim for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability for plaintiffs who alleged damages attributable only to
'lost resale value"); In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, 7 F. Supp. 2d 792
(E.D. La. 1998) (plaintiffs could not state a claim under either Louisiana or Texas law
for economic loss from allegedly defective air bags).
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physical injury,181 I will assume that Michigan does in fact allow such
a cause of action to illustrate the potential problem. By allowing the
claims to be grouped together as a class action and certified under the
law of Michigan, the Ysbrand court created a cause of action for
plaintiffs who would not otherwise have had one. Thus, the Oklahoma
court used its procedural rules via the class action device to expand
the substantive rights of would-be plaintiffs in an impermissible
manner. If the class action device enables the court to hold the
defendant liable under one state's law to all of the plaintiffs in a given
class, the court would create a situation where the defendant "could be
found liable to plaintiffs residing in all 50 States and the District of
Columbia for conduct that would not be actionable if [it] were sued in
individual actions in jurisdictions applying a different law." 18 2
Because of the limitations placed on state courts through their
individual versions of the Rules Enabling Act and the doctrine of
separation of powers, when making preliminary procedural decisions a
court should ignore the presence of the class action itself.18 3 Instead, a
court must examine the potential class members' claims and rights
individually when answering questions such as choice of law.18 4 The
mere fact that a class is proposed does not give the court freedom to
treat the individual rights of the class members in ways that are
different than if the case were brought as a series of individual claims.
Thus,
consolidation alone does not warrant changing the applicable law. A state may or may
not have a sensible approach to choice-of-law problems, and it may or may not want to
change its approach. But whatever approach a state uses, it should use the same
approach across the board; an individual's rights should not change just because his or
her claim is adjudicated together with the claims of others.
1 85
c. Possible Infringements on the Rights of Other States
In addition to providing practical guidance to state and federal
courts, state choice-of-law rules are also significant in a greater way.
The underlying force driving (and, perhaps more importantly,
restricting) choice-of-law considerations is the U.S. Constitution.'16 As
181. Id. at 7 ("Respondents have argued, and Petitioner disputes, that Michigan is in the
minority and will permit a 'no injury' claim.").
182. Id.
183. Kramer, supra note 21, at 576.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250 (1992).
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Professor Douglas Laycock explains, "choice of law within the United
States is inherently constitutional law. Choice-of-law questions are
about the allocation of authority among the several states."18 7 Courts
of one state adjudicating claims of litigants that are not citizens of
that state, or claims regarding actions that took place beyond the
states' borders stand on the brink of overstepping their
constitutionally allocated powers.188 Therefore, "when a state chooses
its law despite another state's significantly closer connection to the
controversy, it has imposed its law on its neighbor. Accordingly, other
states' interests are not respected, and, more importantly for due
process, neither are the interests of the citizens of those states."
18 9
As the United States does not have federal choice-of-law
principles to restrict states' adjudicatory powers, the choice-of-law
principles of the individual states check the ability of courts to
adjudicate actions from other states using the laws of yet other states.
If one state's law should govern a claim but the forum state incorrectly
applies a different state's law, the forum state subtracts from the
power of the state whose law should be applied to the claim. In the
class action setting, this constitutional issue is magnified because the
certifying state risks overstepping the bounds of forty-nine states, not
just one. Thus, the question of whether the law of the defendant's
principal place of business is an appropriate choice of law is crucial.
The effect of an incorrect choice-of-law decision would be an
unconstitutional infringement on the power of every other state.
A court certifying a class using the law of the defendant's
principal place of business will create precisely such an infringement:
it will take claims that, if filed individually, would most likely be
governed by the laws of individual states, and through the use of the
class action, will allow the law of one state to govern all of the claims.
For example, the sale of a minivan manufactured by a company
incorporated in Michigan by a Texas dealer within the state of Texas
to a Texas consumer will be regulated and adjudicated under the laws
of Michigan if a court takes the Ysbrand approach. This violates the
Constraints on state choice of law emanate primarily from the United States
Constitution. The main constitutional clauses that provide constraints on choice of
law are the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which limits a state's
power over the individual and protects individual liberty, and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which preserves state sovereignty.
Fruehwald, supra note 37, at 40. See generally Kermit Roosevelt, III, The Myth of Choice of Law:
Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2503-34 (1999) (discussing the full faith and credit
clause implications of a court's choice-of-law decision).
187. Laycock, supra note 186, at 250.
188. See Fruehwald, supra note 37, at 70.
189. Id. at 71.
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most basic notion of state sovereignty. Texas is the state that has an
interest in the adjudication of the claim, so Texas law is the law that
should govern.
As the Supreme Court articulated in State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, "A basic principle of federalism is that
each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct
is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction."'190 The principles of
federalism reserve to each state the power to regulate commerce
within its borders. Therefore, a class action that wholly usurps this
power and places it in the hands of the state where the defendant
holds its principal place of business unconstitutionally infringes on the
individual power reserved for each of the fifty states.' 91
V. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OCCUR WHEN
A COURT CERTIFIES USING THE LAW OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BUSINESS, COURTS SHOULD NOT USE THIS METHOD
The constitutional problems that arise when a court uses the
law of the defendant's principal place of business as the controlling
law dictate that this approach should not be tolerated. A court faced
with a class action grounded in state law claims should only use the
law of the defendant's principal place of business when a valid choice-
of-law analysis conducted on an individual basis would point to the
law of the defendant's principal place of business as controlling law. 92
The constitutional problem arises because courts usually do not choose
the law of the defendant's principal place of business when the case
arises out of actions in a different state. Furthermore, such choice
may be flawed because of due process concerns of fundamental
fairness to the defendant. Therefore, "[i]f courts cannot consolidate
190. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003); see also Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) ("[Tlhe 'Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders."'); Amicus Brief,
supra note 113.
191. Amicus Brief, supra note 113, at 4.
[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the
jurisdiction of that state.., without throwing down the constitutional barriers by
which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon
the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends. This is so
obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called into
question and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
192. Kramer, supra note 21, at 576.
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without changing the applicable law, they should forego consolidation
and find a different answer."
193
There may, in fact, be a better answer. There are other
possible ways to get around this so-called choice-of-law problem, such
as grouping state laws, separating individual issues, and even
conducting fifty-state surveys and awarding damages accordingly.
194
Of course, out of all these methods, the option of certifying under one
single law (e.g., the law of the defendant's principal place of business)
seems the most attractive as it is somewhat of a "quick fix."
If, under the choice-of-law methodology of the forum state, a
court would have actually chosen to apply the law of the defendant's
principal place of business to each individual claim, nearly all of the
concerns raised by this Note would be moot. The existence of the class
action would do nothing more than add to the sheer number of claims.
If, however, a choice-of-law analysis on an individual basis would not
point to the law of the defendant's principal place of business as
controlling, then the law of that state cannot be used. This is true
regardless of whether due process prevents a court from applying the
law of the defendant's principal place of business. Courts cannot use
the existence of a potential class to justify using the law of the
defendant's principal place of business if the state's choice-of-law rules
would not dictate the application of this law in an individual case.
Therefore, unless Congress solves the choice-of-law problem by
creating a uniform federal choice-of-law standard or by enacting
federal law to govern the substantive claims raised in these types of
class actions, the choice-of-law problem will and should remain a
barrier to the aggregate treatment of claims grounded in state law.
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193. Id. at 580.
194. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815 (1985).
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